Abstract: In the present study, we conducted the first ever Correspondence Test in order to test whether job applicants who voluntarily disclose their HIV infections face prejudices in the selection process in Greece. Resumes differing only in an applicant's health status were faxed to advertised job openings. The outcomes imply that employers use health conditions as a factor when reviewing resumes. The rate of net discrimination against HIV-positive males was between 82.6 percent and 97.8 percent. Similarly, net discrimination against HIV-positive females was between 81.6 percent and 98.8 percent. Interestingly, the degree of discrimination was randomly assigned and unrelated to an applicant's education level and job status. The current study develops a new methodology that could promote researchers worldwide to conduct similar surveys. As efforts to address HIV discrimination grow, so does the need for a set of standard discrimination indicators that have been tested and validated.
Introduction
HIV infection fits the profile of a condition that carries a high level of stigmatization: it is perceived as a great danger and often arouses fear of contagion (Herek, 1999) . Since the earliest days of the AIDS epidemic, people carrying the infection and those suspected of being infected with HIV have been subjected to social ostracism and employment discrimination (Gostin and Webber, 1998) . Worldwide, there are documented cases of job discrimination related to HIV/AIDS: job applicants are passed over for recruitment, and workers are dismissed, denied promotions, excluded from social benefits and other entitlements, and refused entry into foreign territories for employment purposes on account of their HIV status (Barragan, 1992; Omangi, 1997) . Nevertheless, a firm that refuses a job or terminates employment must show that an individual poses a direct threat to the performance of routine job duties.
1
Sociological and psychological surveys of public opinion revealed a widespread fear of the disease, and a lack of accurate information about its transmission (Herek, 1999) . Economists, on the other hand, have not yet explored the relationship between labour market outcomes and HIV status. In the current study, we develop for the first time an experiment to determine if known HIV-positive applicants are treated differently in the hiring process from their equally skilled, but uninfected, counterparts in Greece. The Correspondence Test approach, so named for its simulation of the communication between job applicants and employers, involves sending carefully matched pairs of written job applications in response to advertised vacancies to test for discrimination in hiring during the initial stage of selection for an interview (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) .
Methodologically, based on Riach and Rich (2002) , health conditions can be identified by a paragraph in the applicant's curriculum vitae explaining the applicant's special health status. For the purposes of this study disclosure of an applicant's HIV status is necessary; otherwise, the practice of hiding one's HIV status is likely to reduce the measurable impact of discriminatory behaviour. Since people living with HIV are generally reluctant to reveal their condition, collecting data about them is difficult and analysis of the potentially obtained data presents additional challenges.
2 As experimental economists, we wish to explain real-world issues and to provide knowledge and insight that are relevant to improving our understanding of the world as it is and to help solve the problems faced by individuals.
The data were gathered from June 2007 through February 2008 in Athens, the capital of Greece, as part of the Athens Area Study (AAS) conducted by the University of Crete. The 2007 AAS is one component of the Multi-City Study of the Scientific Center for the Study of Discrimination (SCSD). Our estimations suggest that HIV discrimination is a real issue in the Greek labour market: discrimination against HIV-positive applicants exists and is significant. Meanwhile, the degree of discrimination is unrelated to an applicant's education level and job status.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our methodology, the structure of the investigation, and the model used to capture the relevant relationships. In the third section, we present our estimations and analysis of these results, and the last section presents our conclusions.
Methodology

HIV-Disclosure
There have been numerous Correspondence Tests evaluating health and disability discrimination in the hiring process.
3 The scope of these tests is to estimate to what extent employers are prone to adapt their recruitment and selection criteria, their job assignments and classifications, and their employee assistance programmes when an applicant has a chronic health limitation. While much progress in the discrimination literature has been made through these studies, they have often neglected the issue of unequal treatment on the basis of HIV-status.
In our experiment, an applicant's health condition was directly denoted by a reference in a special information part of the line, 'Driven by deontological considerations I inform you that I am seropositive, that is, an HIV (+) carrier. I am healthy, productive, and fully capable of performing all the duties of the position. Recommendations upon request'. On the other hand, for half of the applicants, no explicit information on health status was provided. These were classified as the uninfected applicants.
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Although individuals with HIV are not usually required to disclose their HIV status to employers, they may still face issues in the labour market as a result of their infection. Here we mention two examples of HIV-status-related events that frequently take place during the hiring stage. In the first place, it is a very common practice in Greece to request pre-employment medical history questionnaires. These questions trouble applicants from a moral standpoint regarding disclosure of their HIV status. To be precise, we present some factual questions from a relevant questionnaire that goes something like that: 'During the past years: a) Have you ever or are you being treated for, or have you been told that you have any sickness or injury? If yes, describe; b) Have you ever consulted or been examined or treated by a physician? If yes, provide the name and address of the physician'. Second, the dominant applicants must undertake psychical examinations performed by the firm's medical centres.
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Such centres return applicants' examination files to firms' corporate headquarters before hiring becomes official. In both cases, if an applicant is identified as HIV-positive it is left to the firm's discretion to decide whether she/he should be hired. In our case, we choose to voluntarily disclose HIV status in order to capture some trends and to help formulate an unbiased estimate of the degree to which an applicant's health condition may contribute to her/his chances of being hired.
Apart from the aforementioned reasons for HIV-status disclosure, we argue that there are particular reasons why an applicant may voluntarily disclose her/his health conditions. In our experiment we suggest that an HIV-positive applicant may disclose information in this way in order to identify whether firms are prone to providing any reasonable adjustments to the recruitment and interview process or to evaluate how the successful candidate will function following employment. Employers have a legal duty to provide HIV-positive individuals with any special adjustments or services such an individual might need in order to help them do their job, as long as no unjustifiable hardships in doing so are experienced by the firms (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2007) .
Based on Riach and Rich (2002) , it is necessary to be careful in ascertaining, in each field experiment that detects health discrimination, whether or not the relevant health condition encounters discrimination when human capital and employment cost differences are either non-existent or negligible.
6 Based on the United Kingdom's Disability Discrimination Act of 2005, HIV is a condition that requires only minor changes in firms, and most of those changes carry no additional cost.
7
More importantly, following the AIDS Legal Council of Chicago (2006), most people who disclose their HIV status at work want to protect their rights, such that a discriminatory employer cannot claim ignorance of an employee's HIV status, for instance, in the event of an occupational accident, after which an employee must apply for compensation.
Non-disclosure might reflect an internalization of societal stigma by people with HIV, and such internalization can lead to self-loathing, self-blame, and self-destructive behaviours (Johnston et al., 1995) . Many HIV-positive individuals reveal their status because hiding one's health condition is likely to cause anxiety and stress, which further deteriorate their condition (Herek, 1999) . Coming out at work enables HIV-positive workers to feel more confident, to have a happier work experience, and fosters openness and interactions with colleagues that can often improve productivity (Klitzman, 1997) . It seems that secrecy can characterize relationships not only between the patient and the doctor, but also between the employer and the employee (Maile, 2003) .
Last, but not least, the right of access to particular information allows information on an employee's HIV status to be available to third parties, and this information is oftentimes repeated to unauthorized persons. From a management point of view, it is difficult to control data stored in offices from filtering out during processing. Some people living with HIV take the initiative to inform their employers of their condition before this information leaks from other sources. Qualitative data show that HIV-positive individuals typically regard coming out at the start of employment as a way of avoiding potential dilemmas in the future and of gaining self-recollection (Brown et al., 2001; Nattrass et al., 2004) .
Application Structure
In order to measure occupational access discrimination toward HIV-positive applicants, we fabricated imaginary pairs of individuals, the members of each pair being equal in human capital, who applied to the same job by sending curricula vitae using different fax devices or mail addresses. The two pairs included: a pair of 30-year-old single Greek male applicants and a pair of 30-year-old single Greek female applicants.
We applied to vacancies where there was a demand for male (or female) full-time employment. These vacancies were identified through a sample of advertisements appearing in online newspapers.
The occupational categories were selected with the purpose of creating a sample that is representative of the Greek private labour market. The sample included occupations that require different levels of education. Two types of applicant pairs were mobilized. Those having higher education levels applied to the primary segment: accountants, clerks, economists, lawyers, managers, psychologists, teachers, and technicians. Those having basic education applied to the secondary segment: clerks, salesmen, and workmen.
8 This resulted in a total of four pairs of applicants and eight curricula vitae. For obvious reasons, for each job opening, we sent either a pair of male applicants or a pair of female applicants.
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Each of the fictitious applicants/testers was allocated a male (female) Greek distinctive first and last name, a telephone number, an email, and a postal address. Addresses were selected such that they would be recognized to be as similar as possible, i.e. they were chosen to indicate the same social class.
Each application was designed to equally convey the type of experience that might make an applicant attractive. Higher education applicants had finished universities or technical schools approximately eight years ago. Alternatively, applicants having basic education had finished high school approximately 12 years ago. For both sexes, applicants having higher (basic) education had six (10) years of work experience at a post similar to each vacancy applied to for employment. To avoid detection, the applicants' high schools, universities, technical schools, and previous workplaces were located in different areas of Athens. In addition, male applicants had carried out military service in different areas.
10 Each pair of applicants had similar hobbies and personal characteristics, 11,12 including similar degrees of masculinity or femininity. In our experiment the applicants living with HIV mentioned no pause in her/ his employment career. They also mentioned that they were fully capable of performing all the duties associated with their jobs. Noticeably, our HIV positives were prone to provide employers' recommendations. By doing so, these applicants gave employers an opportunity to identify their productivity.
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The curricula vitae were faxed or mailed simultaneously, within one day of the advertisement appearance and, if the firms were interested in any of the applicants, the applicants could be reached either through available postal addresses, 14 by telephone (voice mail), 15 or by email.
For obvious reasons, the styles of the curricula vitae were different for each pair. Yet, in order to control for the possibility that the style of an application influenced an employer's response, those stylistic differences in application forms were equally allocated between the paired applicants. 
The Model
The most common econometric approach for capturing the effects of discrimination is to ask if people who are similar in all observable and economically relevant ways experience similar labour market outcomes. In the current study, the probability of an applicant receiving a job interview was estimated according to the Probit model:
where Y* is the regression explaining the probability of receiving a job interview; α is a constant; X refers to health status, which equals one (zero) if the applicant is HIV-positive (in all other cases); e is the disturbance; and i denotes an individual. In Correspondence Testing (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark et al., 1996) , all applicants must be matched with regard to all characteristics other than health status. Since we controlled for all characteristics except health status for the two applicants representative of each pair, the latter was not expected to correlate with the error term in each equation. Equation (1) was estimated simultaneously for all types of jobs and for each type of applicant, and we reported marginal effects.
17 For completeness, two models were estimated. The first model controlled only for differences in health status between applicants. The second model controlled additionally for the curriculum vitae type, sending order, and for common time effects (nine dummies). Notice, however, that the use of occupation and education controls was appropriate in average estimations.
Research Limitations
This study left many questions unanswered. The Correspondence Test can be effective only in demonstrating discrimination during the initial stage of a selection process and in measuring the results of the selection process (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) . In this context, however, it is important to know whether an applicant will eventually obtain a job.
Researchers in this field consider employers, managers, and human resource departments as a single unit: 'the employer'. Hence, a usual drawback that arises is the obscurity of how many employers are targeted. The industries and levels in the occupational hierarchy may very well impact labour market invitations for interviews. Unfortunately, this information cannot be acquired given the design of the Correspondence Test. Additionally, this study by no means represents the entire Greek labour market.
Experimental economists might initially feel distaste for the deception involved in these kinds of field experiments. Researchers may also worry about inconvenience to employers. In the Correspondence Test, nevertheless, the unit of study is the firm, not a human subject (Pager, 2007) . The general lack of veracity in the market place, the social harm inflicted by discrimination, and the superior accuracy and transparency of the Correspondence Test justify deceiving the subjects of the experiments (Riach and Rich, 2004) . The reasons for lack of deception in the field of experimental economics is to maintain pure subject pools and to ensure that behaviour is not changed based on worries about deception (Pager, 2007) .
Estimations
HIV/AIDS in Greece -Preliminary Facts
Greece has subscribed to the 'International Labour Organization Code of Practice for HIV/AIDS in the Workplace ' (2001) , 18 the 'United Nations Millennium Declaration of 2000' , the 'Declaration of Commitment on HIV/ AIDS (United Nations General Assembly, 2001)', and has joined all coordinate carpentries of the European Union aimed at managing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In spite of these commitments, however, no national legislation concerning labour protection and HIV/AIDS has thus far occurred. In addition, the European Antidiscrimination Labour Legislation (EC/2000/78) does not currently protect HIV-infected individuals from discrimination.
There are currently no statistics for how many people living with HIV are employed, 19 and we do not know their labour characteristics or industrial relations. One reason we know nothing about the economic effects of HIV status is that there are no representative data matching HIV status with economic outcomes. One main cause of this is that social planners have not taken an interest in evaluating the phenomenon. Nevertheless, one study of Greek firms' responses to HIV/AIDS, conducted by the World Economic Forum (Executive Opinion Survey, 2006), has been quite illuminating. The vast majority of responders (95 percent) do not feel that HIV/AIDS currently affects their firm's operation. The national findings suggest that Greek firms have not attempted to quantify the business risk due to HIV/AIDS.
Descriptive Statistics
The outcome of the Correspondence Test is presented in a format following McIntosh and Smith (1974) that has since been adopted in field experiments across Europe. Panel A in Table A1 .1 presents the callback outcomes for male applicants with higher education (Appendix 1). The last row shows the aggregated results and the second column shows that applications were sent to 862 job openings. The third column shows that, in 452 cases, neither individual was invited for an interview. In the remaining 410 cases (column four), at least one applicant was invited. In 14 cases (column five), both applicants were invited (equal treatment), in 392 cases (column six) only the uninfected was invited, and in 4 cases (column seven) only the HIV-positive applicant was invited. The net discrimination against the HIV-positive applicants, 20 which is presented in the last two columns, was 388 cases, or 94.6 percent. The statistical significance of any finding of net discrimination was determined according to the chi-squared test (Heckman and Siegelman, 1992) . Although the HIV-positive applicants satisfied the jobs requirements, uninfected applicants were systematically favoured over infected applicants.
Similarly, turning our attention to male applicants with basic education, the rate of net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants was 112 cases, or 95.7 percent, for which the decision not to interview can solely be attributed to the applicants' heath status (Panel B).
21 On average, regardless of the education level, the net discrimination against the HIV-positive applicants was 500 cases or 94.8 percent, as demonstrated in Panel C. By sending equivalent resumes to apply for entry-level jobs, we revealed the presence of strong HIV discrimination.
Call-back outcomes for female applicants are reported in Table A1 .2 (Appendix 1). Panel A shows that the net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants with higher education was 291 cases or 92.9 percent. Similarly, as shown in Panel B, the net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants with basic education was 156 cases or 97.5 percent.
22 Finally, Panel C shows the average results for females. The net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants was 447 cases or 94.5 percent. These outcomes demonstrate a substantial gap in callbacks based on applicants' HIV statuses. 
Health Status-Dummy Estimations
As shown in Panel A in Table A3 .1, the estimated probability of male HIVpositive applicants with higher education to receive an interview is 45.2 percent, lower than that of the uninfected applicants, which suggests that HIV-positive applicants do not receive equal chances of access to occupations (Appendix 3). Based on Panel B, the estimated probability of HIV-positive males with basic education to receive an interview is 42.5 percent, lower than that of the uninfected male applicants. Discriminatory practices severely complicate the job search for applicants living with HIV whenever they take the chance to voluntarily disclose their health condition. On average, as shown in Panel C, the estimated probability of male HIV-positive applicants receiving an interview is 44.6 percent lower than that of the uninfected applicants.
By comparing across occupations, we find large gaps ranging from 35.6 percent to 55.2 percent (Tables A4.1 and A4 .2, Appendix 4). Obviously, the degree of discrimination is randomly assigned across occupations and is unrelated to education level, job status, or segmentation. The estimated probability of HIV-positive applicants receiving an interview is 55.2 percent lower for teachers and technicians, 50.0 percent lower for salesmen, 48.1 percent lower for lawyers, 46.2 percent lower for economists, 43.0 percent lower for workmen, 39.5 percent lower for psychologists, 39.3 percent lower for accountants, 37.7 percent lower for clerks with basic education, 36.1 percent lower for managers, and 35.6 percent lower for clerks with higher education, compared to that of uninfected applicants.
Female applicants living with HIV appear to receive more callbacks than males. However, this gender gap seems to be negligible compared to any of the other HIV-related gaps. Panel A in Table A3 .1 shows that the estimated probability of HIV-positive applicants with higher education receiving an interview is 37.2 percent lower than that of uninfected applicants (Appendix 3). Furthermore, Panel B shows that the estimated probability of female HIVpositive applicants with basic education receiving an interview is 40.5 percent lower than that of uninfected applicants. On average, Panel C shows that the estimated probability of female HIV-positive applicants receiving an interview is 38.3 percent lower than that of uninfected applicants.
As shown in Tables A4.1 and A4 .2, the exclusion rate for female applicants varied between 29.6 percent and 48.8 percent as compared to uninfected applicants (Appendix 4). The estimated probability of HIV-positive applicants receiving an interview compared to the probability of the uninfected group was 48.8 percent lower for lawyers, 45.6 percent lower for saleswomen, 41.0 percent lower for economists, 40.0 percent lower for technicians, 39.3 percent lower for teachers, 38.8 percent lower for workwomen, 35.2 percent lower for clerks with basic education, 34.5 percent lower for clerks with higher education, 32.9 percent lower for accountants, 29.6 percent lower for psychologists, and 27.8 percent lower for managers. Similar to the estimations obtained for males, the degree of discrimination was randomly defined across occupations and was extraneous to education level and job status.
For all cases, we re-estimated Model 1 including the following control variables: the type of curricula vitae, sending order, occupation applied to and time effects; the impact of these variables on the outcome was negligible (Model 2 -Columns 2 and 4). Since experimental conditions are equally assigned, these controls do not substantially affect the estimated effect of health status, but they make the estimate more precise.
Current estimations suggest that discrimination against individuals living with HIV at work is a matter of importance in Greece. The estimations reveal that firms do not seem to understand that protecting staff through workplace activities is a natural first priority of programmes, followed by looking to the wider community. More importantly, Greek firms do not offer HIV-positive applicants the opportunity to discuss any health-related issues.
In this section, we briefly review the two main strands of the theoretical literature on labour market discrimination: distaste for the minority (Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973) .
The basic argument of Becker's discrimination theory suggests that individuals living with HIV can potentially face occupational access discrimination. The taste hypothesis describes discrimination as a preference or taste for which the discriminator is willing to pay. In particular, the employers' taste for discrimination is based on the idea that they want to maintain a physical or social distance from certain groups or that they may fear that their customers or co-workers dislike interacting with minorities. Instead of making common assumptions that employers consider only employees productivity, that workers ignore the characteristics of those with whom they work, and that customers care only about the quality of the goods and services provided, Becker suggests that discrimination coefficients incorporate the influence of characteristics unrelated to productivity on tastes and attitudes, such as HIV status.
The statistical theory of discrimination is also potentially useful for interpreting the results. The statistical discrimination theory suggests that unequal treatment is a result of a profit-maximizing response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers. In a world of imperfect information, employers face risks when hiring workers, and specific characteristics become inexpensive screening devices. If employers believe that there is a systematic differential between HIV-positive and uninfected applicants in their reliability aptitude and job stability, then these concerns might be sufficient to create a permanent differential in access availability. In this situation, discrimination is not the consequence of exogenous preferences, but of profit-maximizing behaviour of risk-averse employers.
Keep in mind, however, that more complicated formulations of the human capital approach have suggested a wider range of factors responsible for determining unemployment rates between majority and minority applicants. For instance, Segmentation Theory made an attempt to demonstrate the role of practices at the workplace and of organizational levels in creating inequalities and leaving productive potential underutilized (Rubery, 1995; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994) . 24 The issue of HIV discrimination is then complicated by the wide variety of firm-specific labour market forms, the strong influence of occupational factors in determining employment practices and their impact on HIV-positive workers' employment positions and prospects, as well as problems associated with making comparisons at the sectoral level across markets.
Conclusion
The current study applies for the first time an experimental design in a realworld setting that allows for the evaluation of whether actual employers discriminate against persons living with HIV in the employment search process. The outcomes show that applicants who voluntarily disclose their HIV-status face great difficulty in obtaining an interview regardless of their education level and job status. Citing either employer distaste and/or employer perception that HIV status signifies lower productivity, job applicants living with HIV get substantially fewer callbacks for each resume sent out. The estimations suggest that discrimination continues at alarming levels and that we need to more closely examine the effects of HIV discrimination and labour market characteristics on employment for the HIV-positive population in Greece.
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Notes
18 The ILO Code contains principles that should guide government, employee, and employer organizations in member States on policy and practice in specific areas, including the adoption of legislation to cover HIV/AIDS in the workplace. 19 In 2007, the cumulative number of reported HIV infections in Greece (n ≈ 10.6m), including AIDS cases, was 8584 (Hellenic Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007) . 20 The most common way to measure the overall incidence of discrimination is to count the number of times a minority applicant is treated less favourably in a single type of firm behaviour than the majority applicant and then subtract the number of times the majority applicant is treated less favourably, mainly with regard to random incidents. The result is a net measure of the number of acts of discrimination a minority applicant can expect to encounter during each application to a firm (Heckman and Siegelman, 1992 (Table A1 .2) are statistically insignificant when tested by the z-test. HIV applicants' education levels played no role in their access to occupations. 24 In the estimation portion, we considered the influence of Segmentation Theory. We included education-level dummies, as well as occupation dummies; hence, basic trends were controlled for. In addition, we performed separate regressions for male and female applicants. Notice also that we present paired observation for each occupation. By doing this, we gained partial control over idiosyncratic differences in employers' evaluations based on common characteristics that plague ordinary observational studies. 
